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IntroductIon
In January 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that development pol-
icy would be among the priorities of the German presidency of the G7 group, 
and promised to continue measures against poverty as part of the UN so as 
to eliminate it by 2030. Development policy has attracted increasing attention 
for many years and is strongly supported by the German public. According to 
a survey conducted by TNS Emnid in July 2013, 81% of respondents backed Ger-
many’s engagement in the fight against poverty, and 80% wanted public ex-
penses on development co-operation to be raised. Even though these expenses 
have been growing every year, they are still not even close to the level of 0.7% 
of GNP, as has on numerous occasions been set as Germany’s goal. However, de-
velopment co-operation is not viewed by Germans as a form of humanitarian 
aid but rather as an agreement between equal partners who mutually benefit 
from this co-operation. 
This report presents the most important trends in German development policy 
and analyses how Germany utilises this policy to promote its own economic 
and political interests. The research methods used are primarily observation 
of political developments and analysis of German governmental documents. 
Some German experts have also been interviewed. Most of the data presented 
in this report are sourced from the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (BMZ) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)1. 
The report is divided into three parts. The first part analyses the objectives of 
German development policy and its evolution. The second part presents the 
principles by which Germany is guided in its development policy, together 
with its regional priorities. The third part discusses individual instruments 
of German development policy, such as development loans, consultancy for de-
veloping countries and German equipment supplies. The report also shows the 
significance of the key actors in German development policy, the links existing 
between them and the resulting problems. 
1 OECD reports on development policies of the member countries of the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee are published every five years. The latest one, which was used dur-
ing the work on this report, was published in 2010 and contains data for 2005–2010. 
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tHESES
1. German development policy is intended primarily to support the German 
economy. Development co-operation and the state’s significant share in de-
velopment projects reduce the investment risk for German entrepreneurs 
who operate in the developing countries. The development policy is also 
aimed at building economic and political ties, and this makes the partners 
partly dependent on German technologies. This is essential for Germany, 
given the fact that its economy heavily relies on exports. One proof for the 
existence of this approach is the choice of German priorities in develop-
ment policy towards individual countries, which allows continued co-op-
eration without any restrictions even after development co-operation has 
formally ended. 
2. Germany’s development policy is guided by two key principles: win-win and 
conditionality. The first principle means that both the developing countries 
and Germany benefit from the projects. This approach guarantees support 
from the German public and also encourages private companies to become 
actively involved in development policy. The second principle of the Ger-
man development policy is conditionality of granting funds. If a partner 
fails to implement the goals set under the agreements, the funds are cut, 
and further co-operation may be suspended. This has a disciplining effect 
on Germany’s partners and ensures that its objectives are strictly enforced. 
3. Germany’s development policy is implemented primarily along bilateral 
lines. Around two thirds of the German development policy budget is al-
located on the basis of inter-state agreements. This guarantees a precise 
definition of both the project goals and the conditions on which funds are 
granted. Furthermore, bilateral co-operation builds up the ‘made in Ger-
many’ brand as part of both development projects and further economic 
co-operation, thus indirectly making Germany’s partners dependent on 
German goods and services. Bilateral agreements cement lasting relations 
with developing countries. This also has an impact on the perception of 
Germany as a country engaged in solving global problems and contributes 
to its positive image in the international community.
4. The selection of the objectives, the long-term operation and the establish-
ment of economic and political ties – all this makes the German approach 
oriented towards building relations with developing countries even af-
ter the development projects end. As a result, co-operation is established 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
7
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
15
primarily with those countries which have an average level of income and 
which are likely to become strictly economic partners for Germany within 
a shorter timeframe, rather than with the poorest countries which require 
the highest level of financial support and where investment risk is the 
highest. The pragmatic choice of priorities also enables a smooth transi-
tion from development to economic co-operation. This approach is also in 
line with Berlin’s consistent reduction of the number of countries which 
are classified as developing countries with which it co-operates; and this 
makes Germany’s moves more effective. 
5. The greatest share of Germany’s development budget goes to Africa. It con-
sumes more than one third of expenditure as part of German development 
policy. Africa is viewed by Germany on the one hand as a continent with 
a substantial but often undiscovered economic potential, and on the other 
as an area of instability and risk, potentially posing a threat to Germany 
also. In connection with the Arab Spring, Germany has launched special 
transformation programmes for North Africa and has increased its share 
in development co-operation in relations with other countries. Germany 
thus wants to prevent a wave of refugees coming from this area to Germa-
ny, offering them the opportunity to find jobs at home, and to stabilise se-
curity in the region. At the same time, Germany would like its development 
policy projects to help it reinforce its economic position in North Africa and 
compete with France and Italy, which are strong in this region, and also 
with the expansive Chinese economy. 
6. Development policy, along with German diplomacy and defence policy, 
is the third element of Germany’s foreign policy. Within this framework 
it plays above all a preventive role against international conflicts. Invest-
ing funds as part of development projects in the areas affected by military 
conflicts or at high risk of such conflicts is viewed by Germany as a contri-
bution to overcoming crises or removing their causes. Such measures also 
stem from the conviction that international conflicts, wherever they ap-
pear, are harmful to the German economy which heavily relies on exports. 
Engagement in development policy is also viewed in a positive light by the 
German public and is supported as one of the key elements of Germany’s 
foreign policy. 
7. The greatest challenges of development policy include the multitude of 
institutions which form this policy and the lack of effective communica-
tion and coordination between them. The Federal Ministry for Economic 
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Development (BMZ) was established in 1961, but it did not become a sin-
gle decision-making centre. At the same time, debates conducted so far on 
making development policy a competence of the Federal Foreign Office and 
liquidating the separate ministry have failed to cause integration of the 
two institutions partly due to the BMZ’s role in party policy. Control of this 
ministry guarantees one of the coalition members the opportunity to be 
present on the international arena (in addition to the Federal Foreign Office 
and the Ministry of Defence), and is an important element of post-election 
coalition negotiations. 
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IntroductIon: tHE compEtIng approacHES  
In gErman dEvElopmEnt polIcy
German development policy was one of the first foreign activities of the Ger-
man government after World War II. In 1952, Germany co-financed the budget 
of the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance for the economic devel-
opment of under-developed countries, and the first German fund for develop-
ment co-operation worth DM50 million was established four years later. The 
Ministry for Economic Development (at present, the Ministry for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, BMZ) was established in November 1961 and 
was headed by Walter Scheel (FDP), who later served as Germany’s president. 
German development policy from its onset served to support German foreign 
and economic policy, which was quite restricted after World War II. Since it 
was conducted in the reality of the Cold War, the principles of the Hallstein 
Doctrine were also followed in contacts with developing countries in order to 
restrict the recognition of the GDR under international law. This meant that co-
operation was established only with those countries which had no diplomatic 
relations with Eastern Germany. German development co-operation from the 
very beginning performed the function of promoting the German economy. 
This approach allowed an expansion of the list of countries to which this kind 
of support was provided. 
Two main approaches to Germany’s development policy can be distinguished: 
social and economic. The former, mainly represented by the bloc of left-wing 
parties, is focused on the needs of the countries receiving aid. This policy was 
adopted between 1969 and 1974 by the SPD–FDP coalition and Chancellor Willy 
Brandt2 (the BMZ was at that time headed by Erhard Eppler from the SPD) and 
between 1998 and 2009 by the SPD–Green Party and the 
CDU–SPD coalition, when the ministry was led by Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul 
(SPD). Since 1998, German development policy has been treated as part of the 
‘global structural policy’3. In the SPD’s opinion, development should engen-
2 Willy Brandt from 1980 chaired the Independent Commission on International Development 
Issues appointed by the World Bank. The results of the commission’s work were presented at 
the UN forum. They provoked a discussion on the need to change the approach in develop-
ment policy and to place a greater emphasis on such values as security, human dignity, justice 
and equality rather than countries becoming richer. Cf: Brandt Report: Das Überleben 
sichern, 1980, http://www.nachhaltigkeit.info/artikel/brandt_report_1980_519.htm 
3 The SPD–Green Party coalition agreement of 1998, http://www.spd.de/linkableblob/1850/
data/koalitionsvertrag_bundesparteitag_bonn_1998.pdf. 
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der structural reforms in the developing countries for which they themselves 
should be responsible in the first place, while the responsibility for reforms 
of international financial and trade institutions rests mainly with the OECD 
countries4. 
The second approach, promoted by politicians from the CDU and the FDP5, 
places the economy foremost in development policy. This approach was formed 
partly by the economic crisis in the late 1960s, as a consequence of which Ger-
man governments focused much more on their own economic interests than 
before, including on guaranteeing access to fossil fuels. Germany has also re-
mitted part of the debts of the developing countries on conditions set by the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank, imposing on these 
countries the obligation to conduct structural reforms. The tendency to em-
phasise German interests in development policy continued until the end of 
Helmut Kohl’s term in office, even though an ideological element was added 
to it – the protection of human rights in developing countries. The Christian-
Liberal coalition in 2009–2013 (Dirk Niebel from the liberal FDP was the min-
ister in charge of development policy then) also stressed the economic aspect 
of development policy and placed an increasing emphasis on co-operation with 
countries with a large economic potential in a given region, which were re-
ferred to as emerging markets (Schwellenländer). 
The new vision of the policy was aimed at improving development conditions for example 
through adopting new global trade rules, more beneficial for developing countries, and en-
couraging richer countries to become engaged in sustainable development. 
4 The catalogue of the basic elements of the ‘global structural policy’ includes concentration 
of funds allocated for development policy, above all on reducing poverty, protection of the 
natural environment, prevention in military conflicts, investments in renewable energy 
sources, a greater focus on regional projects rather than only on bilateral ones, greater role 
of the state in development policy and refraining from putting the burden of this policy on 
private firms, and the search for new forms of Public-Private Partnerhsips. Cf: F. Nuscheler, 
Globale Strukturpolitik: Entwicklungspolitik unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung, 
[in] S. Schmidt, G. Hellmann, R. Wolf,  Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, Wiesbaden 
2007, pp. 680-682. 
5 One exception to this rule was the approach adopted by Helmut Schmidt (SPD), who after 
the oil crisis in 1973 focused primarily on support for the German economy and guarantee-
ing access to raw materials for German companies as part of his development policy. 
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I. gErman objEctIvES and IntErEStS  
In dEvElopmEnt polIcy 
Development policy in Germany is referred to as Entwicklungszusammen-
arbeit (development co-operation) and not Entwicklungshilfe (development 
aid). The ministry in charge of this policy established in 1961 was named the 
Ministry for Economic Co-operation, which from the very beginning suggest-
ed that the tasks of its staff would be primarily focused on economic relations 
with developing countries. The term ‘development co-operation’ also suggests 
that negotiations and agreements between Germany and a developing coun-
try are conducted on terms of equal co-operation, and fits in with the slogan 
of ‘assistance for self-assistance’ (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe) promoted by Germany. 
It implements the main objectives of its development co-operation through of-
fering tools for combating poverty (understood in an increasingly broad con-
text, including energy poverty), creating workplaces and building lasting eco-
nomic growth in developing countries (for example, by means of low-interests 
loans or consultancy and training). 
According to the coalition agreement, the goals of German development policy 
include “combating hunger and poverty, and strengthening democracy and 
the rule of law, while respecting our own values and interests”6. Reduction of 
poverty has been accorded top priority in this policy since the very beginning. 
The objectives of development co-operation are linked to the main interests of 
Germany: 
 − support for the German economy; 
 − stabilisation of international and German security; 
 − co-forming the global development policy agenda; 
 − preparation for maintaining relations with developing countries ‘post-de-
velopment assistance’ (such as in the case of China); 
 − reinforcing the global governance system.
1. Support for the german economy 
One of the main tasks of the German development policy is to support the Ger-
man economy. Germany believes that significant involvement of companies is 
6 The coalition agreement between the CDU, the CSU and the SPD of 2013, p. 126; https://www.
cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf 
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a necessary condition for an effective development policy. Private enterprises 
hus improve the economic condition of the developing countries and have the 
opportunity to increase their exports to these countries (see Appendix 1). Sec-
ondly, German firms have facilitated access to new markets where the invest-
ment risk is often high but the development potential is also significant. Fur-
thermore, firms build networks of informal connections while implementing 
the projects, which helps them gain new contracts in the future. Politicians 
also frequently emphasise the significance of German economic interests in 
development co-operation7.
Development policy is also expected to help ensure raw material supplies to 
Germany. This became essential during the oil crisis in 1973, and this ten-
dency strengthened when the prices of raw materials increased in 2004/2005. 
Furthermore, critical raw materials are gaining significance in the German 
economy (including cobalt, platinum, germanium, niobium, tantalum and 
tungsten) as well as rare-earth metals (such as cerium, zirconium, dyspro-
sium, europium, yttrium and lanthanum) which are necessary in the process 
of creating modern technologies8. Development policy in this area is expected 
to support the actions of other ministries, including in building raw material 
partnerships and conducting the ‘raw materials dialogue’ hand in hand with 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi). Its another objective is 
to lead to the strengthening of the economies of developing countries through 
the modernisation of their natural resources sectors. BMZ supports developing 
countries in commodities production through consulting, the improvement of 
education quality, strengthening of state structures and support for develop-
ment of co-operation with private companies and for combating corruption 
and improving transparency in the cash flow on commodities markets9.
7 The coalition agreements contain provisions indicating that German development policy is 
aimed at contributing to creating new jobs in Germany, Ibidem, p. 162, http://www.cdu.de/
sites/default/files/media/dokumente/05_11_11_Koalitionsvertrag_Langfassung_navigier-
bar_0.pdf ; an approach like this was presented for example by Dirk Niebel in an interview 
for Handelsblatt daily newspaper, http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/dirk-
niebel-entwicklungspolitik-darf-auch-interessengeleitet-sein/3498804.html 
8 Cf. Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, The natural resources deficit: the implications for German 
politics, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-02-08/natural-re-
sources-deficit-implications-german-politics
9 BMZ, Entwicklungspolitisches Strategiepapier Extraktive Rohstoffe, 2010, pp. 8, 22-23 http://
www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/reihen/strategiepapiere/Strategiepa-
pier299_04_2010.pdf. Examples of such co-operation include projects with Mongolia con-
cerning the protection of the natural environment and education in the mining sector, co-
operation with Vietnam in development of mining supervisions, and the development of 
state institutions in charge of raw material production in Ghana, Malawi and Namibia. 
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2. the stabilisation of international security
Development policy performs preventive functions in the regions facing the 
risk of conflict and stabilises the areas where conflicts already exist. This stems 
from the belief that conflicts – wherever they occur – adversely affect the Ger-
man economy, and their consequences can also be felt in Germany (for example, 
organised crime or fights between various ethnic groups). The connection be-
tween German development policy and security policy was initiated by Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schröder, who stated at the World Economic Forum in New York 
in February 2002 that “there is no global security without global justice”10. At 
present, 50% of the countries with which Germany is engaged in development 
co-operation are affected by conflicts or have an unstable situation11.
The impact of development policy on German security policy is manifested 
for example by the fact that the BMZ (along with the Chancellor’s Office, the 
Federal Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the BMWi) co-decides on 
exports of German weapons, and participates along with the Federal Foreign 
Office and the Ministry of Defence in developing guidelines for the German 
government on strategies to be adopted with regard to unstable countries 
and regions12. Germany also tries to match the interests of development pol-
icy and security policy with the international community, for example by 
chairing together with France the World Bank’s working group in charge of 
policy towards unstable countries and through engagement in the prepara-
tion of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security 
and Development. 
10 F. Nuscheler, Entwicklungspolitik. Lern- und Arbeitsbuch, Bonn 2012, p. 37.
11 Entwicklung für Frieden und Sicherheit. Entwicklungspolitisches Engagement im Kontext 
von Konflikt, Fragilität und Gewalt, p. 3; http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publika-
tionen/reihen/strategiepapiere/Strategiepapier328_04_2013.pdf 
12 Since 1998, the BMZ has participated in the meeting of the Federal Security Council (Bun-
dessicherheitsrat) which grants licences for export of weapons and is a member of an inter-
ministerial commission on civilian prevention of conflicts. Documents developed with the 
participation of the BMZ include: Für eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung gegenüber 
fragilen Staaten – Ressortübergreifende Leitlinien, 2012; the guidelines on Africa (Afrika-
politische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung, 2014) and the guidelines on support for Afghani-
stan (Neue entwicklungspolitische Strategie für die Zusammenarbeit mit Afghanistan im 
Zeitraum 2014–2017). The BMZ has also developed a concept for development co-operation 
with unstable countries (Entwicklung für Frieden und Sicherheit. Entwicklungspolitisches 
Engagement im Kontext von Konflikt, Fragilität und Gewalt, 2014). This concept sets the 
goals of development policy in the area of security. These goals include: eliminating the rea-
sons of conflicts, instability and violence, improving the capability to resolve conflicts in a peace-
ful manner, and creating conditions for peaceful and inclusive development. 
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Development policy is also an important element of the German ‘integrated se-
curity’ concept (vernetzte Sicherheit) – the civilian-military approach to chal-
lenges and risks in the area of security. This approach means the use of civilian 
instruments in foreign operations, including those utilising diplomacy (media-
tions and negotiations), police and the administration of justice (training for po-
lice, judges and public prosecutors) and projects covering development and eco-
nomic co-operation to the same extent as military measures13 (see Appendix 2).
3. co-forming the international development policy agenda 
Berlin has actively co-formed the UN development agenda by holding interna-
tional conferences devoted to development policy issues and through partici-
pation in the group of experts working on the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
intended to replace the United Nations Millennium Development Goals14. The 
BMZ also has its representatives in the WTO directorate and in the Develop-
ment Banks: African, Asian, Inter-American and Caribbean and inside vari-
ous international organisations operating in the area of development policy, 
including the UN in Geneva and New York, the OECD and the FAO. 
The former German president, Horst Köhler (supported by a team of advisors from 
the Federal Foreign Office, the BMZ, the GIZ (Association for International Develop-
ment) and KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) has taken part in the High-Level 
Panel of Eminent Persons initiated in 2012 in the process of creating the future pol-
icy of the UN (Post-2015 Development Agenda). In this new agenda, Germany wants 
to combine the eradication of poverty (which is a binding element of the agenda 
as a whole) with the promotion of ecological sustainable development, and to in-
clude Global Governance issues within it. Both developed countries and those who 
aspire to join this group (Schwellenländer) and developing countries should each 
hold an equal share of the responsibility for the implementation of this policy15. The 
13 Justyna Gotkowska, W połowie drogi do pełnoletności – niemiecka polityka bezpieczeństwa. 
Między presją sojuszników i ambicjami politycznymi a brakiem strategii i sceptycyzmem 
społeczeństwa, Biuletyn Niemiecki, No. 4 10 March 2010, pp. 5-6, and Justyna Gotkowska, A weak 
link? Germany in the Euro-Atlantic security system, Point of View, OSW, 15 January 2015, pp. 16-18.
14 Bonn is frequently chosen as the venue of conferences devoted to development issues, part-
ly because the UN agencies are located there. Conferences concerning Afghanistan have 
been held there (in 2001, 2002 and 2011; the one in 2004 was held in Berlin). Bonn also host-
ed the conference Advancing the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, which was 
co-financed by the BMZ, where the interests of the civil society concerning Post-2015 Devel-
opment Agenda were emphasised. 
15 Cf. BMZ, Die post-2015 Entwicklungsagenda. Unser Beitrag, http://www.bmz.de/de/was_
wir_machen/ziele/ziele/millenniuFederal Foreign Officeiele/unser_beitrag/index.html 
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Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) concept, which is based on co-operation between 
private companies and public institutions in development projects, would also be 
strengthened in the new agenda16. In the opinion of some German think tanks, the 
new UN concept should also be aimed at combining a number of topics (for example, 
creating so-called green workplaces based on ecological economy and cities of the 
future) and utilising the experiences of the Bonn conference in 2011, which led to 
several issues being conjoined: security of clean water reserves, energy issues and 
food issues. Experts have also appealed for a better evaluation of the new agenda17.
Chart 1. German Official Development Assistance (ODA) as compared to the 
other OECD countries in 2008, net in billions US$
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Source: OECD, Entwicklungsausschuss (DAC), PEER REVIEW 2010
16 Dirk Niebel (FDP) has supported and propagated it. He wanted to turn this instrument into 
a driving engine of German development policy. Cf. Armutsbekämpfung Nebensache, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/kritik-an-entwicklungshilfe-armutsbekaempfung-
nebensache-1.1021032; Wir betreiben doch keine Kolonialpolitik, http://www.theeuropean.
de/dirk-niebel/7263-deutsche-entwicklungskooperation 
17 Cf. M. Beisheim, ‘Ein Review-Mechanismus für die Post-2015-Ziele nachhaltiger Entwick-
lung’, SWP-Studien, Oktober 2014; Embedding the environment in the Post-2015 Agenda, 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Beisheim_
EmbeddingTheEnvironment.pdf, Nachhaltige Entwicklung für alle. Endspurt zu den Mil-
lenniuFederal Foreign Officeielen und Roadmap für die Post-2015-Agenda, http://www.
swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-aktuell-de/swp-aktuell-detail/article/nach-
haltige_entwicklung_millenniuFederal Foreign Officeiele_und_post_2015_agenda.html
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Chart 2. German ODA as compared to the other OECD countries in 2008, net % GNP
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4. ‘post-development’ co-operation
Through its development policy Germany has been laying the foundations for 
co-operation with those countries which will join the group of developed coun-
tries in the future. Germany has been building both economic and political 
contacts between the donor state and the developing country. By implementing 
joint projects (bi- or trilateral), Germany has been developing a model of co-op-
eration and dependence (on equipment, services and maintenance provided) 
which continues to operate when post-development co-operation in the strict 
meaning of the term ceases. This approach provides additional grounds for the 
term used by the BMZ of ‘development co-operation’ and not ‘development aid’, 
which would have ended when the project ends. To reinforce this effect, Ger-
many co-operates primarily with so-called Lower Middle Income Countries 
(LMIC), which in 2007–2008 received 48.4% of German Official Development 
Assistance (ODA)18. In the case of these countries, the infrastructure neces-
sary to implement development projects is better adjusted to German needs. 
Furthermore, co-operation with LMIC does not require making everything 
18 Deutschland. Entwicklungsausschuss (DAC). Peer Review, OECD 2010, p. 56, http://www.
oecd.org/berlin/46270433.pdf
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from scratch (and is thus not a copy of humanitarian aid) and enables switch-
ing to the post-development phase and embarking on business projects within 
a shorter timeframe. 
Chart 3. ODA share according to income groups in beneficiary countries in %
LDC LIC LMIC UMIC
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One example of such an approach is Germany’s development policy towards 
China. For 30 years, until 2009, Germany offered China 4.034 billion euros as 
part of development co-operation and 635 million euros as part of technical 
co-operation, focusing on projects aimed at improving the rule of law, better-
conditions for foreign investment and climate and natural environment pro-
tection. A strategic partnership was established between the governments in 
Beijing and Berlin in 2009. Since this moment, China is no longer classified 
as a country with which Germany is engaged in development co-operation. 
This is due to the perception that a country which has a reputation of an eco-
nomic power hould not be covered by the orthodox instruments of German 
development policy, and that Germany benefits less from such co-operation 
than for example from supporting foreign trade. However, the fact that devel-
opment co-operation has ended does not mean that Germany no longer sub-
sidises development projects from the budgets of other ministries or federal 
states19. This new form of co-operation allows Germany and China be involved 
19 Even though development co-operation between Germany and China has ended, part of the 
funds allocated by Germany for development policy still goes to China. This concerns, for 
example, projects financed by the BMU (implemented by the GIZ) or grants offered by Ger-
man federal states to Chinese students. Cf. Noch immer fließt Geld nach China, FAZ, http://
www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/ende-der-entwicklungshilfe-noch-
immer-fliesst-geld-nach-china-11043481-p2.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2 
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in development projects according to the trilateral formula20. This concerns for 
example Africa, where Germany views China’s economic expansion as a threat 
to its own interests, and trilateral co-operation could contain this expansion. 
The institution which guarantees the continuity of economic and institutional 
contacts after the end of development co-operation is the Association for In-
ternational Co-operation (GIZ) which has operated in China for 25 years (until 
2011 it was known as GTZ – Association for Technical Co-operation), which acts 
as an intermediary between German and Chinese institutions as part of both 
development co-operation and strategic partnership. The GIZ employs around 
200 people in China and was in charge of around 50 projects in 201421. The top 
priorities of the GIZ’s engagement in China after 2009 include: sustainable eco-
nomic development, environmental protection, energy and natural resources 
issues22. Political contacts with Beijing have also intensified since 2011 partly 
through holding intergovernmental consultations. Previously, Germany took 
similar action with regard to Saudi Arabia, which since 2008 is no longer clas-
sified as a country with which Germany would engage in development co-op-
eration either. 
5. reinforcing the global governance system 
Germany has also aimed at reinforcing global governance through develop-
ment policy, for example the presence of developing countries in such forums 
as G20 and their participation in the decision-making process concerning glob-
al economy. Germany wants more and more developing countries to join global 
governance forums and to coordinate their stances at international forums. 
This approach is implemented as part of the BMZ’s programme ‘Global Part-
nership’ (it is coordinated by the GIZ), which has two components: the train-
ing project aimed at developing contact networks named Managing Global 
Governance and a project designated for the exchange of views named Globale 
Maßnahmen. As part of Managing Global Governance, Germany has since 
20 Trilateral co-operation in the BMZ’s development policy means co-operation in the joint 
implementation of projects by a partner with Germany, an emerging power and a develop-
ing country. Owing to this, the costs of the project and the investment risk are shared. Each 
party may also capitalise on the previous experience and contacts of their partners. 
21 GIZ-Büro China, http://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/377.html 
22 Part of the funds are still sent to China as part of co-operation with federal states. German 
federal states finance grants and research visits to university, allocating to this a total of 
around 160 million euros. Cf. Noch immer fließt Geld nach China, http://www.faz.net/ak-
tuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/ende-der-entwicklungshilfe-noch-immer-f liesst-
geld-nach-china-11043481-p2.html?printPagedArticle=true#Drucken 
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2005 held trainings and workshops on certain topics (for example, on elimi-
nating poverty, protection of the natural environment, and modern solutions 
in the energy sector) dedicated to young leaders from Egypt, Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan and South Africa. Other forms of training 
offered by Germany include: two-week training courses held by the Federal 
Foreign Office (International Futures) and two and a half months internship at 
German or European institutions. Participants in the training courses are also 
supported by Germany in the areas of introducing innovations and organisa-
tional change once they return to their countries. As part of the latter project, 
Globale Maßnahmen, the GIZ holds conferences and consulting meetings with 
project partners. 
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II. tHE prIncIplES of gErman dEvElopmEnt polIcy 
1. Win-win
German development policy is guided by the win-win principle, which means 
that co-operation must be beneficial to both parties. The benefits developing 
countries receive include the necessary expertise, management capabilities, 
new technologies and capital; and all this contributes to building new work-
places and raising residents’ incomes, and thus helps eliminate poverty. Ger-
man entrepreneurs view this as an opportunity to gain new markets and build 
contacts and networks. The degree of risk is limited in their case, considering 
the strong engagement of the state (partly through loans granted). This also 
brings benefits to German taxpayers (owing to new jobs in Germany), for whom 
this is a good argument to invest more in development policy23. This princi-
ple also applies to trilateral co-operation (a developed country, a developing 
country and Schwellenländer, like India, Brazil, Mexico), where co-operation 
should also result in a win-win situation. 
2. a fishing rod instead of a fish
Germany emphasises the need to shift an increasing burden onto the develop-
ing countries themselves. Guided by the principle of ‘assistance for self-assis-
tance’ (Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe), it offers developing countries tools to overcome 
problems linked to poverty or environmental protection by themselves. Ger-
many also wants lower middle income countries to become involved to a great-
er extent than before in development projects, so that these become a driving 
engine for economic development in their respective regions. 
Furthermore, the BMZ has reduced the number of beneficiaries of develop-
ment co-operation in the strict meaning of the term, treating them as Global 
Development Partners (GEP), and thus also reducing the availability of BMZ 
technical and financial assistance to them24. This allows some of the German 
development aid measures (including PPP and grant funding) to be combined 
23 Cf. An interview with Dirk Niebel, minister for economic co-operation and development, 
Entwicklungspolitik darf auch interessengeleitet sein, http://www.handelsblatt.com/poli-
tik/deutschland/dirk-niebel-entwicklungspolitik-darf-auch-interessengeleitet-sein-
seite -2/3498804-2.html
24 The list of countries defined by Germany as partners to which the Global Development Part-
ners concept was applied in 2011 includes Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, India and South Africa, 
which are classified by the OECD as developing countries. 
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with those aimed at supporting the German economy abroad (including the 
mobilisation of private funds, support for private firms, sectoral dialogue and 
support for scientific research). Germany intends to intensify co-operation 
with international organisations by promising to change the distribution of 
votes at such institutions as the World Bank and the IMF to the benefit of GEP 
countries. Germany has emphasised the need for GEP countries to make a sig-
nificant contribution to joint projects with Germany and wants them to par-
ticipate more actively in trilateral co-operation (Germany–GEP–developing 
country). 
3. bilateral co-operation 
German development co-operation is predominantly of a bilateral nature. 
This is important because a provision setting out proportions between devel-
opment co-operation taking place under the aegis of international organisa-
tions and for bilateral agreements between Germany and a developing state 
was included, for example, in the coalition agreement of 2009. It stipulates 
that one third of the funds must be allocated as part of multilateral organisa-
tions, while two thirds as part of bilateral agreements between Germany and 
developing countries25. 
Bilateral co-operation promotes German solutions branded as ‘made in Ger-
many’. By entering into bilateral agreements, Berlin influences the conditions 
of co-operation and sets the priorities for expenditure and the allocation of 
technical co-operation. In this meaning, bilateral co-operation is a successful 
political tool for propagating German interests, such as in international organ-
isations. This is particularly important at the UN, where each country has one 
vote at the General Assembly, and developing countries can support Germany’s 
candidates for non-permanent’ embers of the UN Security Council or its other 
bodies (such as the Human Rights Council). 
25 Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. http://
www.csu.de/common/_migrated/csucontent/091026_koalitionsvertrag_02.pdf, p. 129.
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Table 1. The largest individual beneficiaries of co-operation 
1997–2001
millions US$ % ODA
China 370 9
Indonesia 198 5
India 183 4
Egypt 177 4
Turkey 144 3
2002–2006
millions US$ % ODA
Nigeria 625 10
Iraq 494 8
China 392 6
Cameroon 220 3
Serbia 205 3
2007–2008
millions US$ % ODA
Iraq 1 975 19
Cameroon 669 7
China 552 5
India 289 3
Afghanistan 256 3
Source: OECD, Entwicklungsausschuss (DAC), PEER REVIEW 2010
4. reinforcing diplomacy  
German public opinion polls indicate that Germans support an active for-
eign policy above all in the non-military area26. Public support is traditionally 
26 According to surveys published in May 2014 ordered by the German Federal Foreign Office 
and the Körber Foundation, 60% of Germans oppose a “stronger engagement of Germany in 
overcoming international crises”, and only 37% of them support this (in a survey conducted 
in 1994 by RAND Corporation, 62% respondents expressed their support for this). At the 
same time, respondents indicated “guaranteeing peace worldwide” (51%) and “Germany’s 
security” (23%) as the most important goals. The respondents saw protecting human rights 
(66%), natural environment and climate protection (59%) and guaranteeing fuel supplies 
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strong for humanitarian aid (which is a prerogative of the Federal Foreign Of-
fice27) and international negotiations are reinforced with the desire to inten-
sify development co-operation as a manifestation of “taking a greater respon-
sibility” for the global order. 
Building the foreign policy / defence policy / development policy triad is a Ger-
man response to crisis management in military conflicts. This is evident in the 
‘integrated security’ (vernetzte Sicherheit) concept, which combines various 
elements of crisis management: from the use of military force through peace 
negotiations to economic and development co-operation, which in Germany’s 
opinion contributes to building secure and stable countries and regions. 
Development policy is an inseparable element of German foreign policy (hence 
the appeals for placing these issues on the agenda of the Federal Foreign Of-
fice), which is always present in dealing with international crises or unstable 
regions. This is backed by the conviction that economic development and the 
improvement of social conditions lead to stability, security and peace. 
5. regional priorities of german development policy 
In 2012, European developing countries received 948 million euros as part of 
German development policy. In turn, Germany spends most of its funds on Af-
rican countries – in 2012 total German ODA for Africa was worth 3.761 billion 
euros. On the one hand, Germany views Africa as an unstable continent, and 
the consequences of this instability as a threat to Europe, including Germany 
(refugees, terrorism, piracy, organised crime). On the other hand, it can see Af-
rica’s increasing importance in terms of economy (both rapid economic growth 
and increasing middle class), demography, raw materials and agriculture. 
Germany sees this as an opportunity for its own products, technical exper-
tise and investments and expanding political influence in Africa. Germany di-
vides Africa into two areas: Sub-Saharan Africa and North African countries. 
(57%) as the most important tasks for German foreign policy. According to polls, in order to 
make sure that German foreign policy goals are achieved, Germans are ready to accept that 
their country could intensify civilian international measures for example as part of hu-
manitarian aid (86%), diplomatic negotiations (85%) and support for civil society (80%). 
They would, however, reject any possibility of greater military engagement of the Bun-
deswehr (82% respondents oppose this) and more intensive supplies of weapons to allied 
countries (82% respondents are against this.
27 The BMZ also has a programme in the area between classical development policy and hu-
manitarian aid: Entwicklungsfördernde und strukturbildende Übergangshilfe.
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It focuses in both cases above all on consultancy offered to state administration 
and supporting sustainable economic growth28. Partnerships for modernisa-
tion have been established with North African countries which will stabilise 
and secure the southern borders of the EU, and thus indirectly also of Germany 
(see Appendix 7). 
Germany pursues two major goals in its development policy towards Africa: it 
wants to increase its own economic engagement and to prevent an inflow of ref-
ugees29. Berlin has employed for this purpose, for example, the promotion of raw 
materials production as a leverage for the economic development of these coun-
tries. Germany views assistance in the use and modernisation of infrastructure 
as an opportunity to anchor itself in the African market. Berlin has also made 
attempts to use the formats of multilateral co-operation (such as the Germany–
East Africa–China–India forum) so as to remain in close dialogue concerning the 
region with these countries. Furthermore, Germany has made efforts to improve 
investing conditions for its small and medium-sized companies. Germany has 
employed employed around 2,000 advisors engaged in African countries to have 
an influence on new regulations, by offering advice to both companies and state 
institutions30. In the opinion of the BMZ, one of the ways to scale down the wave 
of refugees from North Africa to Germany is to improve socio-economic condi-
tions in the countries covered by development policy31 byprogrammes aimed at 
eliminating poverty, developing agriculture and running German-African cen-
tres at universities in Tanzania, South Africa, Ghana, Congo and Namibia). In 
addition to this, to ensure security and improve crisis management, Germany 
has appealed for African organisations to be allowed to play a more important 
role as part of the UN32. A deeper partnership with Africa has been one of the 
priorities of the German presidency in the G7 group in 2014–2015. 
28 The main goals set by the BMZ in 2004 with regard to Africa; these are used as the basis for 
guidelines for politics adopted with regard to individual countries, http://www.bmz.de/de/
was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/subsahara/index.html 
29 Cf. Artur Ciechanowicz, Kamil Frymark, Szlaban do ziemi obiecanej. Niemcy walczą 
z imigracją socjalną, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2014-11-19/
szlaban-do-ziemi-obiecanej-niemcy-walcza-z-imigracja-socjalna 
30 Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung, p. 12, Berlin 2014, http://www.bundesre-
gierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2014/05/2014-05-21-afrikapolitische-leitlinien.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=1
31 Cf. Bundesminister Müller reist in den Nordirak – die Menschen brauchen eine Perspek-
tive vor Ort, http://www.bmz.de/de/presse/aktuelleMeldungen/2014/oktober/141001_pm_ 
094_Bundesminister-Mueller-reist-in-den-Nordirak-die-Menschen-brauchen-eine-Pers-
pektive-vor-Ort/index.html 
32 Germany insisted on a stronger engagement of the African Union during its presence in the 
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Chart 4. Geographic distribution of German ODA in 2012 
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Source: Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik in Zahlen und Fakten – BMZ (2014)
Asia is the second most important area in German development policy. Ger-
man ODA in 2012 was worth 2.862 billion euros. Co-operation priorities in-
clude: professional training (in 2009, Asian countries received 52% of all the 
funds allocated for this purpose33), protection of intellectual property and en-
vironmental protection issues. As with Africa, in the case of Asia Germany has 
also made efforts to reinforce regional co-operation and has appealed to Asian 
countries to resolve most problems concerning development policy. Support 
for Afghanistan is an essential part of development co-operation in Asia (Ap-
pendix 2). India and Indonesia have been classified by Germany as ‘develop-
ment co-operation partners’. Germany expects these countries to become more 
active in development co-operation projects in Asia, offering them support in 
the form of know-how and funds34. 
South America (with the exception of Oceania, which received 31 million euros 
in 2012) has been given the lowest priority as a region by Germany. In 2012, it 
received 865 million euros as part of ODA. This is because Germany has less 
economic and political interests in this region. Mexico and Brazil, like India 
and Indonesia, have been classified as ‘development co-operation partners’. 
UN Security Council as an impermanent member in 2011–2012, in particular considering 
the outbreak of the Arab Spring. 
33 Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik in Asien BMZ Strategiepapier Neues Fenster, Berlin 2011, 
p. 10, http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/reihen/strategiepapiere/Strate-
giepapier310_10_2011.pdf 
34 Ibidem, p. 16.
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III. InStrumEntS and actorS of dEvElopmEnt polIcy
1. bilateral co-operation
Bilateral co-operation is the most important part of German development 
policy. The BMZ allocated 3.041 billion euros for this purpose (47.2% of its 
budget). However, if subsidies from other ministries and federal states are 
taken into account, this amount is higher and reaches around two thirds of 
the total sum allocated for development co-operation, which in 2013 reached 
US$14.06 billion35.
The most important issues on which German bilateral development co-opera-
tion is focused are: 
1) eliminating poverty,
2) securing peace and democratic development, 
3) fair development of globalisation, 
4) environmental protection. 
These are described in more detail and with greater precision in the ten areas 
defined in the governmental Guidelines for bilateral technical and financial co-
operation with the partners of German development co-operation in force since 
200736 . 
The most important documents relate to strategies for individual countries - 
these are used as the basis for setting specific goals and conducting bilateral 
policy with regard to developing countries formulated by the BMZ (often in 
35 This is confirmed by data presented by the OECD in: Deutschland. Entwicklungsausschuss 
(DAC). Peer Review, OECD 2010, p. 55, http://www.oecd.org/berlin/46270433.pdf. The minis-
tries concerned include above all: AA, BMU, BMBF, BKM, BMELV, BMG, BMWi, BMVg, 
BMAS, BMF, BMI, BMFSFJ, BMJ and BMVBS. According to information from the BMZ, the 
total sum engaged in Germany’s bilateral co-operation in 2012 reached around 6.765 billion 
euros. http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/reihen/infobroschueren_flyer/
flyer/Faltblatt_FaktenMDG.pdf
36 This concept mentions the following focal points: democratic and civil governance (includ-
ing human rights), peace development and crisis prevention, education, healthcare, family 
planning, HIV/AIDS, pottable water, water management, ensuring food, agriculture, pro-
tection of the natural environment, protection and sustainable use of natural resources, 
sustainable economic development, energy, transport and communication. Leitlinien für 
die bilaterale Finanzielle und Technische Zusammenarbeit mit Kooperationspartnern der 
deutsch en Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, BMZ Konzepte 165, http://www.bmz.de/de/me-
diathek/publikationen/reihen/strategiepapiere/konzept165.pdf 
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co-operation with other ministries). They are used by the BMZ, in tandem 
with the countries covered by development co-operation, to develop the so-
called State Concept (Länderkonzept), which defines more precisely and nar-
rows down this co-operation to three priorities37. The concepts also indicate 
concrete instruments of development co-operation (technical and financial) 
designed to implement them. Germany, as part of the intergovernmental con-
sultations prior to concluding an agreement with a developing country, re-
quires the other party to undertake to “create structural and framework con-
ditions for the acceptance of development funds”, and to provide a guarantee 
of tax exemption in the partner state for the German institution involved in 
development co-operation. Furthermore, the partner state should guarantee 
the German staff involved in development co-operation indemnity from penal 
liability while carrying out their tasks and unrestricted entry and exit to and 
from the partner state38.
German bilateral development co-operation is implemented with the use of 
two key instruments: technical co-operation (Technische Zusammenarbeit, 
TZ) and financial co-operation (Finanzielle Zusammenarbeit, FZ). In 2012, 
the BMZ allocated the greater part of its funds to FZ (2.775 billion euros), 
while 2.277 billion euros were spent on TZ. The term TZ covers inter-state 
agreements which are implemented on the German part by the BMZ, and 
on its behalf by implementing organisations, including the GIZ primarily. 
TZ is effected mainly through consulting, financial support for consulting, 
equipment supplies and expert opinions. TZ is used by Germany to promote 
its know-how in the area of technical solutions, economy and management. 
One component of development co-operation, above all its technical aspect, 
are numerous tenders. The assumption is that German entrepreneurs are 
the first to find out about these tenders. The Federal Agency for Foreign 
Trade (BFAI) is in charge of this.
37 In cases where co-operation with a given country is focused on a specific issue and is not 
based on a general approach and also in the case of regional co-operation, German bilateral 
development co-operation is restricted to one issue. Auswahl der Kooperationsländer, 
http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/laenderliste/ 
38 Leitlinien für die bilaterale Finanzielle und Technische Zusammenarbeit, op. cit., p. 42.
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Chart 5. German net spending on ODA in % of GNP
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Source: OECD, Entwicklungsausschuss (DAC), PEER REVIEW 2010
Financial co-operation is another type of bilateral development co-operation. 
It is coordinated by the state-controlled bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wieder-
aufbau), while the political conditions governing co-operation with developing 
countries are set by the BMZ, taking into account opinions from the Federal 
Foreign Office, the BMF and the BMWi. Loans are granted depending on their 
investment nature, how the investment is related to the goals set in the de-
velopment co-operation agreement and the degree of involvement of German 
employees. In the case of projects being carried out improperly, FZ agreements 
provide for the possibility of launching sanction mechanisms (for example, 
limiting or withholding payments). Germany offers FZ in several categories: 
non-returnable support is provided to the least-developed countries (LDC); 
loans with the annual interest rate at 0.75% are offered for 40 years to those de-
veloping countries which are on the World Bank’s list; in the case of the other 
countries, loans with an annual interest rate set at 2% are offered for 30 years. 
Germany also offers loans on market conditions for economic development 
projects (mainly for the development of economic infrastructure, environ-
mental protection and support for the financial sector), which are intended to 
be an offer combining business projects with development policy. In 2011, KfW 
conducted 1,800 projects in over 100 countries39. 
2. multilateral co-operation
The second part of German development co-operation is multilateral co-oper-
ation. The EU is the greatest beneficiary of German multilateral co-operation 
39 KfW Entwicklungsbank, http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/
akteure_ez/einzelakteure/kfw/index.html 
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(1.891 billion euros in 2012), followed by the World Bank group (0.614 billion 
euros in 2012) and the UN (0.262 billion euros in 2012). Germany also supports 
regional development banks and smaller international organisations, spend-
ing over 3 billion euros annually on this (3.389 billion euros in 2012).
In German development policy, multilateral co-operation is complementary to 
bilateral co-operation and allows development funds to be utilised in places 
where the political and financial risk of applying them would be too high for 
Germany by itself. By offering funds to international organisations, Germany 
applies the win-win principle. It takes into account above all the compliance 
of a given organisation’s agenda with German development policy, the areas of 
its operation40 and to what extent it is complementary to German bilateral co-
operation. Germany also takes into consideration its influence on the forming 
of a given organisation’s programme, the strength of voting among its deci-
sion-makers, the financial contribution of its budget and the human resources 
policy on both worker and managerial levels41.
By holding conferences for development co-operation donors and forming 
working groups at the BMZ, Germany is engaged in shaping the framework of 
multilateral development policy42. Berlin wants, amongst other things, emerg-
ing powers to increase their share in the funding of development co-operation 
and to set the conditions for spending the funds. Furthermore, Germany has 
made efforts to ensure that the key international organisations keep close con-
tacts with German organisations involved in the implementation of projects 
funded by international organisations43. 
Over the past few years, Germany has limited (partly under the influence of 
the OECD’s criticism) the number of international organisations it supports. 
This was intended to improve the effectiveness of funds offered. 
40 In the case of multilateral co-operation Germany has focused on: the water and sewage sec-
tor, the energy sector, agriculture, food, sustainable development, human rights and good 
governance.
41 Eckpunktepapier für die multilaterale Entwicklungspolitik, BMZ-Strategiepapier, 2013, p. 12.
42 The tasks of the working groups created at the BMZ include setting the conditions for 
spending EU funds as part of development co-operation.
43 Ibidem, pp. 5 and 9. 
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Chart 6. German ODA: contribution to the development budgets of interna-
tional organisations in 2012 
Total: 2.77 billions of euro
EU – 68%UN – 10%
World Bank group – 22%
Source: Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik in Zahlen und Fakten – BMZ (2014)
3. the actors of german development policy 
German development policy is determined by several institutions (see Appen-
dix 4), and various ministries and Bundestag commissions have this policy 
among their responsibilities. The lack of ready patterns of effective communi-
cation between all the actors of development policy and the political competi-
tion between individual offices make its coordination difficult, thus being one 
of the major challenges this policy needs to face44. 
The BMZ is the largest institution which co-decides on German development 
policy. This ministry has the most staff – around 800 people at the central of-
fice in Bonn and over 100 at foreign agencies (including in embassies which 
form special sections in charge of development policy and agencies operat-
ing at international organisations45) and the largest budget. In domestic poli-
tics, the BMZ is an essential ministry in the process of government coalition 
forming. If a coalition party has its people among its staff, it gains guarantee 
of participation in foreign policy and thus attracts the attention of the media. 
The BMZ – through its participation in secret meetings of the Federal Security 
Council – also influences the granting of licences for arms exports nd is able to 
delegate its representatives to diplomatic agencies. 
44 This aspect has also been emphasised by German experts. This was pointed out in a conver-
sation with the OSW by Professor Theo Rauch from FU Berlin and Doctor Marianne 
Beisheim from SWP, Berlin, 18–20 June 2014.
45 Aufbau und Organisation, http://www.bmz.de/de/ministerium/aufbau/ 
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The Federal Foreign Office also has a strong influence on development policy, first 
of all by setting the political criteria of co-operation with individual countries, 
developing inter-ministerial strategies and guidelines concerning development 
policy (for example, with regard to countries with unstable government struc-
ture ‘Fragile Staatlichkeit’). A separate section in charge of economic issues and 
sustainable development also functions within the organisational structure of 
the Federal Foreign Office. Furthermore, the Federal Foreign Office has created 
a working group which takes part in the preparation of development goals for 
the new agenda of the UN, post 2015. The Federal Foreign Office is also the second 
largest contributor to the German development policy budget, after the BMZ. In 
2012, it allocated 0.9391 billion euros (9.3% of German ODA) for this purpose. 
Other ministries, such as the Ministry for the Environment and Nuclear Safe-
ty (this ministry spent 0.1274 billion euros, i.e. 1.3% of German ODA on devel-
opment policy in 2012), the Ministry for Education and Research (0.1127 billion 
euros; 1.1% of German ODA in 2012)46 and the Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy (partly through the coordination of the German government’s ini-
tiatives linked to raw materials)47 are involved in financial and organisational 
terms in development policy (for example, they have their own special depart-
ments in charge of development policy). 
Chart 7. ODA expenses of individual ministries in 2012 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BMZ
[%]
6.10
0.94
0.72
0.13
0.11
Federal Foreign Office
Federal states
Ministry
for the Environment
Ministry
for Education
Source: Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik in Zahlen und Fakten – BMZ (2014)
46 Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik in Zahlen und Fakten, http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/
publikationen/reihen/infobroschueren_flyer/flyer/Faltblatt_FaktenMDG.pdf 
47 Stärkung rohstoffpolitischer Ansätze in der Entwicklungspolitik, Zwischenbilanz der Rohstof-
faktivitäten der Bundesregierung (Schwerpunkt nichtenergetische Rohstoffe), Juli 2008, BM-
Wi, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/XYZ/zwischenbilanz-der-rohstoffaktivi-
taeten-der-bundesregierung,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf
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It has been debated for years in Germany whether the BMZ should become part 
of the Federal Foreign Office so that to improve the effectiveness and coordina-
tion of development policy and reduce its handling costs. However, given the 
political significance of this ministry, none of the cabinets has decided to make 
this move as yet48 . 
The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition is unlikely to place the Federal Foreign Office in 
charge of development policy and liquidate the BMZ, especially after the ini-
tiative of the new minister for economic co-operation and development, Gert 
Müller (CSU). He puts greater emphasis than his predecessor, Dirk Niebel 
(FDP), on humanitarian issues, labour conditions in developing countries (es-
pecially in the textile industry) and food and agriculture issues (before this 
he served as a secretary of state at the Ministry for Agriculture). One of Mül-
ler’s key projects at the BMZ is the debate concerning the future of German 
development policy. This debate has been branded as ‘Future Card’ (Zukunft s-
charta) and is intended to make Germans aware of development policy issues, 
convince them that development policy begins at home (for example by buying 
fair trade products) and contribute to the formulation of new United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals – Post 2015. One of the main goals of the new 
minister is to join in the preparation and implementation of the German presi-
dency of the G7 in 2015, where development is mentioned as one of Germany’s 
priorities49. 
Since the election to the Bundestag in 2013, the parliamentary commissions in 
charge of development policy, i.e. the commission for economic co-operation 
and development, the budget commission, the commission for human rights 
and humanitarian aid and the commission for foreign affairs have lost signifi-
cance50. This is partly down to the lack of adequate staff among the deputies. 
Some of the deputies who were most strongly engaged in development issues 
48 Plans to make the BMZ part of the Federal Foreign Office were pushed through in the previ-
ous coalition by the liberal FDP. For example, it developed a document titled ‘Papier zur 
politischen Positionierung von AA und BMZ’, which prepared complete integration in three 
stages. However, in practice, only part of the BMZ’s previous competences concerning hu-
manitarian aid were transferred to the Federal Foreign Office. In effect, all responsibilities 
in the area of humanitarian aid are now the prerogative of the Federal Foreign Office. Nie-
bels Plan, http://www.zeit.de/2012/03/BMZ/komplettansicht 
49 Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zum G7-Gipfel am 4. und 5. Juni 2014, Brüssel, 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekon feren zen/2014 /06/ 
2014 -06-05-merkel-pk.html
50 This was pointed out in a conversation with the OSW amongst others by Klaus Brückner 
(GIZ) and Dr. Marianne Beisheim (SWP), Berlin, 18–20 June 2014. 
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lost their mandates, while the newly elected ones view development policy 
(like foreign policy) as an unattractive area to operate in, since they would 
rather become involved in domestic policy and thus build their position among 
the electorate and within their political parties. The Bundestag since 1998 has 
also been the scene of debates devoted as a whole to the issues and implementa-
tion of German development policy. 
German federal states also have development policies of their own, thus decen-
tralising this policy on the federal level and making it difficult to coordinate. 
Each of the sixteen federal states has its own development policy guidelines, 
and attempt to coordinate them during annual meetings of the commission for 
development policy of the federal states and the federation. Federal states are 
involved in development policy first of all by funding grants for students from 
developing countries at German universities (in Germany, education is a re-
sponsibility of the federal states). In 2012, overall expenditure of the federal 
states on development policy reached 722 million euros (7.5% of total ODA)51. 
This policy is conducted through the establishment of co-operation partner-
ships between individual federal states and developing countries, e.g. Lower 
Saxony and Tunisia or North Rhine-Westphalia and Ghana52. Furthermore, an 
agency of GIZ, the main German implementing agency, operates in each fed-
eral state.   
The BMZ’s co-operation with non-governmental organisations, political foun-
dations and churches (Catholic and Protestant) plays a great role in German 
development policy. The great variety of organisations (over 2,000 NGOs) in-
volved in development policy and subsidies from the BMZ (in 2012, political 
foundations received 247 million euros, churches received 218 million euros 
in 2014, and NGOs received 60 million euros in 2012)53 guarantee the base for 
long-term development projects. This also concerns the countries which have 
no adequate institutional and legal infrastructure to conduct co-operation or 
51 BMZ, Zahlen und Fakten, http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/reihen/info-
broschueren_flyer/flyer/Faltblatt_FaktenMDG.pdf 
52 A detailed list of activities in which individual federal states are engaged can be found in: 
Deutsche Länder in der Entwicklungspolitik, http://www.entwicklungspolitik-deutsche-
laender.de/deutsche-l%C3%A4nder 
53 Nichtregierungsorganisationen (Private Träger und Sozialstrukturträger), http://www.
bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/akteure_ez/nros/index.html?PHPSESSI
D=fc344d5ee5f8c660a9d8eed0f38c8796. It was pointed out in the OECD survey published in 
2000 that around 175,000 people are engaged as volunteers in co-operation between north-
ern and southern countries. Cf. http://www.bpb.de/apuz/27118/entwicklungspolitische-
nicht-regierungs-organisationen-in-deutschland 
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in cases where good political relations between Germany and a given country 
do not exist. NGOs are primarily focused on combating poverty (hence most 
of the projects concern education and healthcare), while political foundations 
are active to a greater extent in the implementation of political projects thus 
contributing to the implementation of German diplomacy’s goals. Owing to 
these foundations, Germany is able to carry out its long-term priorities in for-
eign policy (including democratisation, promoting the rule of law, supporting 
the legislative process and combating corruption) everywhere where this is 
impossible with the use of the classical foreign policy instruments and where 
other development policy instruments do not bring the desired effects. Fur-
thermore, engagement in development policy allows Germany to promote po-
litical lobbying, to build a network of contacts in a given country and to obtain 
information which is often much more accurate han official data, all of which 
is necessary to conclude development co-operation agreements54. 
With such an extensive network of institutions involved in German develop-
ment policy, coordination and exchange of information between all the actors 
is a problem. In an attempt to overcome these problems, meetings between 
departments of individual ministries and ad hoc working groups are held. 
However, often as a result of further arrangements at higher levels of German 
administration, and following consultations with development co-operation 
organisations, the initial guidelines are modified and this does not lead to co-
ordinated actions of all the agencies involved. Another problem area is co-op-
eration and distribution of competences between embassy staff delegated by 
the Federal Foreign Office and the BMZ.
Another problem the BMZ needs to face is the limited number of staff, mainly 
in the area of strategic planning. This translates into difficulties in initiating 
political projects and their effective implementation (in both Germany and de-
veloping countries). This also results in the inadequate shaping of internation-
al policy and the policies of other ministries (especially the environmental, se-
curity and foreign policies). Staff shortages also affect the quality of evaluation 
of development policy55. In this case, the BMZ focuses above all on controlling 
54 S. W. Pogorelskaja, Die parteinahen Stiftungen als Akteure und Instrumente der deutschen 
Außenpolitik, http://www.bpb.de
55 Deutschland. Entwicklungsausschuss (DAC), op. cit., s. 68, Furthermore, OECD experts 
have pointed out that a conflict of interest between implementing organisations and the of-
fices to which they offer consulting can be a problem. In such a case, some experts might 
created recommendations guided by the interests of these organisations in the first place. 
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the implementing organisation, including the implementation of the political 
guidelines set out in the BMZ’s strategies and concepts. 
The structure and the great number of entities involved in German develop-
ment policy also poses a problem to foreign partners (one example of the con-
nections between German co-operation institutions in a partner state and the 
central office in Germany is presented in Chart 8). The centralisation of the 
BMZ and its supervisory function with regard to development co-operation 
organisations which are decentralised makes the partner states confused 
about which entity they should consult in a given matter. 
Chart 8. The structure of German development co-operation in Morocco 
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Source: OECD, Entwicklungsausschuss (DAC), PEER REVIEW 2010
German development policy is less effective because the BMZ is unable to co-
ordinate the activities of all its actors to a sufficient extent. Reforms to this ef-
fect have been proposed by both international institutions, e.g. the OECD and 
German experts, including from the German Development Institute (DIE) and 
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SWP (Science and Politics Foundation)56. The main proposals include further 
merger of implementing organisations, which was partly done in 2011 when 
GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, the German 
Association for Technical Co-operation) and InWEnt (Internationale Weiter-
bildung und Entwicklung gGmbH – Continued International Education and 
Development), which were two separate institutions until 200257, merged into 
GIZ. It has also been proposed to unite the financial and technical co-opera-
tion instruments as part of a single programme following Japan’s example, and 
Germany’s greater engagement as part of multilateral development co-opera-
tion, though this is highly unlikely considering German political priorities and 
goals. Furthermore, Germany should restrict the scope of topics covered by de-
velopment co-operation and the number of countries to which co-operation is 
offered. This will allow the BMZ’s resources to be increased and for them to be 
utilised for the carrying out basic tasks58. 
KamIl frymarK
56 Cf. G. Ashoff, Institutioneller Reformbedarf in der bilateralen staatlichen deutschen En-
twicklungszusammenarbeit, p. 4, http://www.die-gdi.de/analysen-und-stellungnahmen/
article/institutioneller-reformbedarf-in-der-bilateralen-staatlichen-deutschen-entwick-
lungszusammenarbeit/; D. Brombacher, Geberstrukturen in der Entwicklungspolitik, 
SWP-Studien 2009, Oktober 2009, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/prod-
ucts/studien/2009_S27_brm_ks.pdf 
57 F. Nuscheler, op. cit., s. 331. 
58 To improve the effectiveness of German development policy, the OECD recommended for 
Germany in its report in 2010: the need to adjust aid so that in 2015 it reaches 0.7% of GNP, 
a level promised by Germany, for example, in subsequent coalition agreements; replacing 
state debt reduction preferred until recently (as part of financial co-operation, which in 
fact does not entail the need to incur additional financial costs) with other forms of devel-
opment co-operation; focusing German development co-operation on African countries 
and regions facing the highest risk of crisis; encouraging new investors to support develop-
ing countries (at the same time, the OECD warns against transforming this process into 
a new instrument for promoting Germany’s own exports); improving the coordination of 
development policy among all its actors; stronger decentralisation of the BMZ by delegating 
part of its competences to diplomatic agencies and improving the evaluation of develop-
ment policy for which the BMZ is responsible to the greatest extent. Cf. Deutschland. En-
twicklungsausschuss (DAC), op. cit. 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
37
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
15
appEndIx 1. THE SECTORAL CONCEPT FOR SUPPORTING PRIVATE 
COMPANIES 
The Sectoral concept for supporting companies (BMZ Strategiepapier 9/2013)59, 
which was amended in 2013, is addressed above all to small and medium-sized 
firms in developing countries. The main goals are: support for companies 
in certain sectors of the economy, support for local and regional economies, 
supporting ecological and sustainable development, reinforcing innovative 
systems and support for institutions representing companies’ interests. To 
achieve these goals, Germany employs as part of technical co-operation: spe-
cialist consulting (mainly in ministries and in the legislative process), dialogue 
programmes and platforms uniting key actors at economic institutions, finan-
cial support for economic organisations and associations. As part of financial 
co-operation, Germany supports political dialogue aimed at creating the con-
ditions for developing private business and improving the skills of key actors 
and experts. In addition to this, Germany promotes PPP partnerships as part 
of joint projects with companies from developing countries. By implementing 
this concept Germany wants above all to improve legal conditions for doing 
business in developing countries and thus encourage German entrepreneurs 
to invest in these countries. Furthermore, Germany wants to create a network 
of contacts and develop collaborating institutions in order to reinforce entre-
preneurship there. The element which is constantly present in this concept is 
support for projects promoting stronger involvement of women in the economy 
and also the use of renewable energy sources. 
The BMZ emphasises in its concept that it offers an opportunity for companies 
from developing countries to become part of the ‘production cycle’ in which 
they will take over certain production stages supplying adequate components. 
This is expected to create additional workplaces and allow them to gain new 
outlets and use German know-how and technologies. 
59 Sektorkonzept Privatwirtschaftsförderung, BMZ-strategiepapier 9/2013, http://www.bmz.
de/de/mediathek/publikationen/reihen/strategiepapiere/Strategiepapier333_09_2013.pdf 
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appEndIx 2. SECURITY VS. DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT  
CO-OPERATION WITH AFGHANISTAN AFTER 2014 
Since 2001, Germany has been strongly active in development co-operation in 
Afghanistan. On 27 November 2001, Germany held a conference in Petersberg 
near Bonn concerning coordination of humanitarian and development aid and 
support for the democratisation of Afghanistan. Germany also organised con-
ferences in 2002, 2004 and 2011. Internal security in Afghanistan and its eco-
nomic and political development were also among German priorities during its 
period on the UN Security Council in 2011–2012. Germany has coordinated the 
council’s policy regarding Afghanistan (in practice this meant presiding over 
work on the Security Council’s resolutions) and chaired the Security Council’s 
commission on sanctions on Al-Qaeda/ the Taleban. 
In 2002–2009, Germany allocated a total of 1.3 billion euros for the reconstruc-
tion of Afghanistan60. In the report concerning the development of the situa-
tion in Afghanistan in 2014, the German government undertook to spend as 
part of development co-operation up to 430 million euros annually by 201661. In 
2014, development co-operation was worth in total 245 million euros. The part-
nership agreement signed on 16 May 2012, which primarily concerns the time-
frame between 2015 and 2024, is the basis of German-Afghan co-operation. 
According to the strategy adopted by the BMZ for co-operation with Afghani-
stan for 2014–2017, the previous priorities of German engagement have not 
changed. Until recently, they were focused on the rule of law, sustainable 
economic development, education, energy and water-sewage projects. Since 
2014, Germany has placed greater emphasis on creating new jobs. At the 
same time, Germany is interested in intensifying co-operation in the area 
of raw material production (for example, through consultancy offered to Af-
ghan ministries concerning production conditions), development of renew-
able energy sources and vocational training. The regional priority of German 
engagement remains unchanged in the new strategy – these are the north-
ern areas of Afghanistan, the provinces: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Kun-
duz, Samangan and Takhar, and Kabul as the capital city. The BMZ is repre-
sented in the northern province by a special envoy. The partners of German 
60 Beziehungen zwischen Afghanistan und Deutschland, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/
DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Afghanistan/Bilateral_node.html
61 Fortschrittsbericht zur Lage in Afghanistan 2014, p. 2, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/
btd/18/004/1800466.pdf 
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development co-operation in the provinces are primarily local governments 
and Provincial Development Committees. 
Conditionality of support offered forms an essential part of German co-opera-
tion with Afghanistan. Germany makes full-scale co-operation with Afghani-
stan dependent on progress in carrying out reforms announced by the Afghan 
government. The strategy includes the stipulation that unless sufficient pro-
gress is made, not all funds allocated for co-operation will be made available62. 
The new strategy determines in detail the indicators for verification of the 
goals set by Germany. For example, in the case of the first priority (rule of law) 
the criteria are: results of public opinion polls in Afghanistan as to whether 
human rights, including above all women’s rights, are respected more than be-
fore 2014; the degree to which analyses concerning combating corruption are 
used to build ministerial structures; a 50% increase of cases in Afghan courts 
where the BMZ’s consulting is used; and a 35% increase in the share of women 
in legal professions. A similar set of indicators has been prepared for all of the 
five priorities. 
Furthermore, the strategy sets the priorities for the Federal Foreign Office, 
which are focused above all on the reform of Afghan law enforcement agen-
cies, support for the construction of hospitals, schools, transport infrastruc-
ture and building capabilities as regards the judiciary, vocational training and 
the reconstruction of destroyed cultural heritage. 
62 Neue entwicklungspolitische Strategie für die Zusammenarbeit mit Afghanistan im. Zeit-
raum 2014 - 2017, BMZ 2014, p. 5; http://ez-afghanistan.de/fileadmin/content/home_page/
Strategiepapier342_03_2014.pdf  
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appEndIx 3. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FINANCIAL 
AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 
Partner’s strategy / dialogue in the partner state /
concepts concerning countries
1. Support proposal
(partner state)
2. Preliminary selection
(BMZ)
4. Standpoints
(IO)
5. Considering IO’s standpoints;
verification/preparation
(BMZ/IO)
9. Programme proposal with common part A and modules (IO)
10. Distribution of orders (BMZ)
11. Implementation of support (IO)
12. Joint report
13. Evaluation (BMZ/IO/Experts)
3. Programme
explanation
(BMZ/IO/project
coordinator)
– part A
6. Programme proposal
preparation
(project
coordinator)
6. Preparation/verification
of development
co-operation modules
(IO)
7. Acceptance
and agreements
under
international law
BMZ priorities/
Implementing
Organisations
(IO)
Source: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/wege/bilaterale_ez/zwischenstaatliche_ez/index.html
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appEndIx 4. GERMAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY SCHEME  
– INSTITUTIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS 
Domestic political and economic background
Foreign political and economic background 
Actors
in developing
countries
International institutions:
e.g. World Bank, UNDP, EU
International
NGOs
Parliament
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budget
commission)
Economic policy
(Ministry for Economic
Affairs and Energy
– BMWi)
Foreign
and security policy
(Federal Foreign Office) Media
Financial policy
(Ministry of Finance)
Development policy
(BMZ)
Agricultural policy
(Ministry of Food
and Agriculture)
Other policies
(other ministries)
Other lobby groups:
e.g. farmers
and trade unions Development policy
lobby
Source: F. Nuscheler, Entwicklungspolitik. Lern- und Arbeitsbuch, Bonn 2012
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appEndIx 5. DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION AND CONSULTING  
IN UKRAINE 
Ukraine has been treated as a partner state by Germany as regards development 
co-operation since 2002. Projects worth 320 million euros were implemented by 
2014 as part of financial and technical co-operation. Germany, after the EU and 
the USA, is the third largest donor in Ukraine. In 2011, development co-operation 
funds reached 33 million euros (11 million euros as part of technical co-opera-
tion, mainly consulting, and 22 million euros as part of financial co-operation, 
loans). This means a 57% increase as compared to 2010, when total development 
co-operation funds were worth 21 million euros. It is worth noting that Ukraine 
has received less development funds from Germany than other countries in the 
region (for example, in 2012, Serbia received 81 million euros, Georgia 59 million 
euros, and Kosovo 28 million euros). German development co-operation with 
Ukraine also intensified in 2014 in connection with the military operation in 
eastern Ukraine. The aid increased to 40 million euros. 
Germany focuses in Ukraine on three major aspects of development co-opera-
tion: sustainable economic development (including investment support and as-
sistance to small and medium-sized companies), renewable energy sources and 
healthcare issues. At the same time, development co-operation instruments 
(mainly loans granted by KfW Entwicklungbank and projects coordinated by 
GIZ as part of technical co-operation) make it possible to implement many other 
projects in the areas of support for agriculture and scientific co-operation. 
Ukraine is the country which has been covered by Germany’s most exten-
sive consulting programme (among Eastern Partnership countries), which is 
mainly linked to Ukraine’s economic and political potential. For many years 
Germany has used the consulting system to press (mostly unsuccessfully) on 
Kyiv to improve investing conditions. Above all, this concerns combating cor-
ruption, shortening the time for issuing permits in the investment process 
and clear interpretation of legal regulations applied. It has also pressed on the 
reform of electoral law, strengthening the rule of law, greater independence 
of judges and weakening the position of public prosecution authorities, and in 
particular of the prosecutor general. Germany also wants to strengthen con-
trol of the competences of public servants and transparency in spending public 
money. It also expects that the practice of informing public opinion of lawsuits 
to a greater extent will be introduced and that public servants will improve 
their qualifications in order to be ready to implement EU law, given the ex-
pected signing of the Association Agreement. 
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To support reforms and legal transformation in Ukraine, the German Con-
sulting Group (Deutsche Beratergruppe) was established in 1994. It focuses on 
preparing macroeconomic analyses regarding the development of financial 
markets, energy, infrastructure, social policy and healthcare. Comprehen-
sive consultation is offered above all to Ukrainian state institutions, including 
ministries, the central bank and parliament representatives. The group’s work 
is fully financed as part of the German programme TRANSFORM (known as 
TRANSFORM-Nachfolgeprogramm since 2005) implemented by the Ministry 
for Economy and Energy. The group closely co-operates with the Institute for 
Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER Kiev) which was established in 
1999 by the Ukrainian government and the German Consulting Group. 
The High-Level Group on Economic Affairs, established in 2005 on the initiative 
of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Viktor Yushchenko, is the most 
important body as regards coordination of economic co-operation. This body is 
in charge of developing joint projects in high-priority economic sectors: modern-
isation of metallurgy and coal mining, certification and standardisation, biofuel 
production, development of transport infrastructure, aviation and shipbuilding 
industries63. This form of economic coordination is supplemented by the pres-
ence of the German Economic Delegation in Ukraine since 1993 and the Ukrain-
ian-German Forum, which was established in 1999 on the basis of an agreement 
between the Ukrainian League of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Ger-
man Economic Association. It serves as a co-operation platform for entrepre-
neurs from both countries, for example through holding mutual presentations 
of entities interested in co-operation and offering legal assistance for those who 
want to open a firm. It is even more important since the president of the forum is 
Rainer Lindner, who also chairs the Committee on Eastern European Economic 
Relations (Ost-Ausschuss); and his deputy is Günter Verheugen (a politician from 
the SPD and a former EU commissioner for enlargement).
German political foundations also play an important consulting role. At pre-
sent, five foundations linked to German political parties operate in Ukraine 
(the Friedrich Ebert Foundation linked to the SPD, the Konrad Adenauer Foun-
dation linked to the CDU, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom 
linked to the FDP, the Hans Seidl Foundation linked to the CSU and the Hein-
rich Böll Foundation linked to the Green Party). They hold workshops, training 
63 Cf. Anna Górska, Współpraca niemiecko-ukraińska – korzystny dla obu stron niemiecki 
pragmatyzm [in:] Łukasz Antas (ed.) Relacje gospodarcze Niemiec z krajami Europy 
Środkowo-Wschodniej, OSW, Warsaw 2008, p. 47.
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courses, conferences for representatives of civil society in Ukraine and they 
co-operate closely with political organisations, thus building strong personal 
bonds between representatives of Germany and future civil society leaders and 
politicians in Ukraine. They also issue publications and training materials and 
organise research visits in Germany and fund grants. Contacts between the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Vitali Klitschko’s party, UDAR, are particu-
larly important for this co-operation. The Christian Democratic political foun-
dation has held training courses and seminars for UDAR (and its youth wing) 
concerning such areas as the consequences of signing the Association Agree-
ment between Ukraine and the EU and the process of adjusting Ukrainian law 
to EU law, as well as the way in which German political parties operate64. In 
addition to this, the weekly magazine, Der Spiegel, revealed towards the end of 
2013 that German Christian Democrats and the European People’s Party (EPP) 
wanted to back the Ukrainian opposition more intensively than before, and 
invited the leaders of Batkivshchyna, led by Yulia Tymoshenko and UDAR, to 
the congress of the European People’s Party in Dublin in March 201465. 
Since 2012, German experts and companies have taken part in the pilot pro-
gramme Energieeffiziente Stadt in Zhovkva. On the Ukrainian side, this en-
terprise was initiated by President Viktor Yanukovych and the Ministry for 
Regional Development, and on the German side this programme is implement-
ed by the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations. Since October 
2013, Zhovkva has been a partner city for Delitzch in Germany. Project financ-
ing is guaranteed by GIZ from the budget of the German Ministry for the Envi-
ronment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety. This programme 
is aimed at improving the city’s energy infrastructure: this concerns first of 
all overhauls of residential and public utility buildings so that they are more 
energy and heat-saving. Germany would like to use here those technological 
solutions which have been successfully employed in other regions of Ukraine, 
and thus to promote German technologies in the energy sector. 
The co-operation also includes support for the food and agricultural sector. 
As part of the German-Ukrainian Agrarian Dialogue programme a long-term 
64 Including Seminar mit der politischen Partei UDAR von Vitali Klitschko, http://www.kas.
de/ukraine/de/pages/12882/; Studien- und Dialogprogramm für Parlamentsabgeordnete 
der Fraktion UDAR aus der Ukraine, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.36203/; Vitali Klitschko: 
Von der CDU kann man viel lernen, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sgq3NsQDTGE 
65 Ost-West-Konflikt um die Ukraine: Merkel kämpft für Klitschko, http://www.spiegel.de/
politik/ausland/ukraine-merkel-will-klitschko-zum-praesidenten-aufbauen-a-937853.html 
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loan worth 11 million euros and a grant worth 3 million euros have been 
granted for the implementation of projects concerning: support for agri-
cultural businesses, development of a loan system for rural areas and sup-
port for the effective use of energy by small and medium-sized companies. 
Another example of the implementation of agricultural projects is German 
consultancy covering the adjustment of plant protection standards to EU 
regulations and those for improving transparency on the land trade market 
(projects implemented by the German Ministry for Food and Agriculture 
since 2012). Furthermore, Germany holds training courses among Ukrainian 
farmers concerning the use of pesticides, and have a predominant share in 
the Ukrainian market for these products66. 
66 Cf. Anna Górska, Współpraca niemiecko-ukraińska – korzystny dla obu stron niemiecki 
pragmatyzm [in:] Łukasz Antas (ed.) Relacje gospodarcze Niemiec z krajami Europy 
Środkowo-Wschodniej, OSW, Warsaw 2008, p. 47.
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appEndIx 6. DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION AND POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA 
German development co-operation in North Africa covers six countries (co-
operation with Syria was suspended in 2011). It has intensified since the Arab 
Spring in 2010 and has been supplemented by special programmes of the Fed-
eral Foreign Office and the Ministry for Economy and Energy. The main goals 
of this co-operation are political stabilisation of the region and improving eco-
nomic conditions in these countries (including investment conditions, which 
would allow Germany to reinforce its own economic position in the region 
which traditionally has close economic relations with France and Italy) and 
restricting the influx of immigrants and refugees to Germany. In 2011, the Ger-
man Federal Foreign Office initiated a programme supporting the democratic 
transformation in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Jordan and Yemen. As part 
of this programme, projects aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, 
including constitution amendments, creating leaders among young people (for 
example, training in Germany), co-operation of higher education facilities and 
economic co-operation are implemented. Annually, the Federal Foreign Office 
allocates 50 million euros on around 200 projects linked to this programme. 
co-operation with individuals countries in the region:
country
co-operation 
sum (million 
euros)
co-operation 
priorities political foundations
Egypt 353 (2012/2013) - the use and man-
agement of water 
reserves 
- climate and natu-
ral environment 
protection (includ-
ing the energy 
sector and waste 
disposal)
- education and im-
proving employ-
ment levels  
- urban develop-
ment 
- human rights
- administration 
reforms
- Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) 
(projects concerning environmen-
tal protection and human rights) 
- Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS) 
(projects mainly focused on the 
decentralisation of power) 
- Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
(FNS)  
An agency of the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation (KAS) was closed in 
2013 after a court sentence was 
passed and the foundation’s work-
ers were sentenced to several 
years in prison on charges of ille-
gal activity and financing contrary 
to the law brought by the Egyptian 
government.
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country
co-operation 
sum (million 
euros)
co-operation 
priorities political foundations
Tunisia 151.5 (2013) - development of 
agricultural areas
- raising employ-
ment levels among 
young people 
- FNS (most projects concern sup-
port for journalists) 
- FES (main engagement concerns 
support for trade unions; actions 
for the protection of women’s and 
young people’s rights) 
- KAS (projects concerning for ex-
ample democratisation, the rule of 
law and civil society)
Morocco 671.7 
(2012/2013)
- water resource 
management
- renewable energy 
sources 
- sustainable 
economic develop-
ment
- FNS (emphasis put on women’s 
rights) 
- FES (mainly support for women’s 
political activity, human rights 
and trade unions)
- HSS (projects addressed to 
employees, academic staff and ad-
ministration aimed at reinforcing 
democratic and legal structures, 
civil society and decentralisation)
- KAS (the priorities are projects 
strengthening democracy and the 
rule of law, civil society and inter-
cultural dialogue)
Jordan 214 (2012/2013) - water management 
- due to the war 
with Syria in 2012 
and 2013, the BMZ 
allocated a total of  
64 million euros 
for care over refu-
gees in Jordan
- FES (projects linked to social 
justice in the broad meaning of the 
term, democratic participation, 
unemployment among young peo-
ple, promoting women’s rights and 
energy and climate policy) 
- FNS (projects concerning corpo-
rate culture, creation of liberal 
conditions of economic develop-
ment) 
- KAS (focused on human rights and 
refugees)
Yemen 93 (2011/2012) - potable water sup-
plies 
- sewage system
- education
- FES (the projects are mainly aimed 
at improving women’s rights and 
employment levels among young 
people)
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country
co-operation 
sum (million 
euros)
co-operation 
priorities political foundations
Palestine 55 (2013) - water supplies
- water and sewage 
systems
- combating unem-
ployment
- administration 
support
- KAS (the projects concern mainly 
support for rule of law institu-
tions, development of local govern-
ment, strengthening civil society 
and support for economic reforms) 
- FES (the projects are addressed 
above all to political and local 
government leaders concerning 
dialogue and democratisation) 
- FNS (the projects concern 
strengthening liberal political and 
economic structures, and political 
and social dialogue in the region)
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appEndIx 7. THE BMZ’S STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS CONCERNING 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
priority documents
Elimination of poverty
- The BMZ’s sectoral concept: Social security (July 2009)
- The BMZ’s sectoral concept: Health in German development 
policy (August 2009)
- The BMZ’s concept concerning the development of agricul-
tural areas and food safety (March 2011)
- The BMZ’s standpoint – Germany’s contribution to sustain-
able combating of HIV (June 2012)
- The BMZ’s suprasectoral concept: Effective elimination of 
poverty worldwide (August 2012)
Democracy and human 
rights
- The BMZ’s concept: Human rights in German development 
policy (May 2011)
- The BMZ’s standpoint: Young people in German develop-
ment policy. Contribution to the implementation of chil-
dren’s and young people’s rights (October 2011)
- The BMZ’s concept: Combating corruption and integration 
in German development policy (June 2012)
- The BMZ’s action plan for the inclusion of handicapped 
people (January 2013)
Education
- The BMZ’s strategy for education – Ten goals for the im-
provement of education (February 2012)
Economy and 
sustainable economic 
development
- The BMZ’s standpoint on raw materials (April 2010)
- The BMZ’s strategy: Contribution of tourism to sustainable 
development and the implementation of the Millennium 
Development Goals (March 2011)
- The BMZ’s strategy: Co-operation with economy (March – 
April 2011)
- The BMZ’s strategy: Aid for Trade – Development policy in 
trade (June – August 2011)
- The BMZ’s strategy: Biofuel – the opportunities and risks 
for developing countries (November 2011)
- The BMZ’s strategy: Investments in rural areas and the 
‘Land Grabbing’ phenomenon – development policy chal-
lenges (January 2012)
- The BMZ’s strategy: waste as raw materials (January 2012)
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priority documents
Greater engagement
- The BMZ’s strategy: Support for constructive state – society 
relations – legitimacy, transparency and responsibility 
(2010)
- The BMZ’s strategy: Co-operate, co-act and co-create – co-
operation with civil society in German development policy 
(2013)
Prevention
- The German government’s concept: Co-shaping globalisa-
tion, developing partnerships and sharing responsibility 
(February 2012)
- The BMZ’s concept: Political and development co-operation 
with global development partners (June 2011)
- Joint guidelines from the BMZ, the Federal Foreign Office 
and the Ministry of Defence on policy towards unstable 
countries (October 2012)
- The BMZ’s concept: Development for peace and security. 
Political and development engagement in the context of 
instability and violence (2013)
Co-operation with 
countries and regions
- The German government’s guidelines concerning the policy 
towards Africa (2014)
- The German government’s concept on Latin America and 
the Caribbean Islands (2010)
- The BMZ’s strategy: German development policy in Asia 
(August 2011)
- The BMZ’s strategy: Co-operation with Afghanistan in 
2014–2017 (June 2014)
Multilateral  
co-operation
- The BMZ’s guidelines on multilateral development co-
operation (2013) 
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appEndIx 8. FORMS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GERMAN 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND BUSINESS 
German development co-operation is based on six forms of co-operation with Ger-
man private companies. According to one of the basic principles of German de-
velopment co-operation, the win-win principle, co-operation between public and 
private institutions allows all parties to enjoy the benefits of co-operation, increas-
es the funds necessary for implementing development policy and often improves 
the effectiveness of projects conducted owing to business know-how. In turn, this 
co-operation lets firms reduce the risk they take when entering a new market, to 
expand it and to gain benefits from building the company’s image (including the 
perception of the firm as an element of business’s social responsibility). 
The main forms of co-operation are:
1. Sponsoring – first of all in the social area and in natural environment pro-
tection. 
2. Formal contact networks – support for the operation of organisations which 
gather together representatives of state administration, entrepreneurs and 
civil society who deal with development policy on a regular basis (above all 
in the areas of improving investment climate and private sector develop-
ment in developing countries). 
3. Development partnerships with economy – the BMZ distinguishes two types 
of partnership: (1) when one of the organisations implementing German de-
velopment policy is a partner for the company – most of such projects con-
cern vocational training in developing countries; (2) when an institution in 
the partner state (generally ministries or implementing organisations in the 
developing country) is a partner for a German company (including banks). 
The following criteria need to be met in order for one of the two partnerships 
to exist: compliance with the development policy goals, complementarity, 
subsidiarity, competitiveness and own contribution67.
4. Public-Private Partnerships – PPP. This form of co-operation has been pro-
moted by the BMZ since 1999. It enables private companies to carry out 
67 Kooperation mit dem Privatsektor im Kontext der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit – Koopera-
tionsformen, p. 8, http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/themen/wirtschaft/Strate-
giepapier304_05_2011.pdf
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public tasks. In the case of development policy, PPP allows the reduction 
of investment risk for companies doing business in developing countries. 
According to the BMZ, 52% of entrepreneurs involved in PPP thus want to 
reduce the risk of entering the market in developing countries68. This form 
of co-operation is seen above all in the areas of infrastructure, energy, tel-
ecommunication, transport and water and sewage projects. 
5. Mobilisation and combining private and public capital – DESERTEC project 
is an example of this form of co-operation.
6. Financial and consulting support for private institutions in developing 
countries has been supported by DEG (German Association for Investment 
and Development) as a subsidiary of KfW bank since 1962; financing pri-
vate projects which are in line with German development policy in devel-
oping countries. Loans are granted on market conditions, above all in the 
area of protecting the natural environment in countries where income per 
resident is low and investment risk is high (these are predominantly pro-
jects which could not gain financial backing under market conditions due 
to excessive risk). 
68 Entwicklungspartnerschaften mit der Wirtschaft, BMZ, September 2014, p. 4.
